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Southern Cone Stabiliz ation Plans
Carlos F. Diaz Alejand ro*
Yale Univers ity
This paper deals with stabiliz ation plans whose costs raise the
question as to whether the remedy is worse than the disease , or what

may be named the Southern Cone case, after the experien ce of countrie s
located at the bottom of South America .

At the outset, however , it

should be noticed that not all stabiliz ation plans are accompa nied by
sharp falls in output and massive income redistri butions .

And not

all such benign stabiliz ations occur in Asia or Africa; within Latin
America there are also examples of relative ly small short-te rm costs
of stabiliz ation followed by rapid growth.

Colombi a in 1967 is one such

1/
case, but there are more.The first section of the paper will outline the initial conditio ns and

the historic al backgrou nd to Southern Cone stabiliz ation plans.

The

typical package of policy measure s will also be discusse d briefly .

The

second section will describe a stylized scorecar d of the consequ ences
of the plans.

The third section will discuss some fresh complic ations

introduc ed into stabiliz ation plans by the high degree of interna tional
capital mobility observed in the late J.970s.

Normati ve sections will close

the paper, covering both the nationa l and interna tional dimensio ns of the
Southern Cone case.
The topic at hand is controv ersial.

In its purely economi c dimen

sion it deals with an area, short~ru n macroec onomics , which during the
late 1970s was unsettle d.

Debate in the industr ialized countrie s echoes

-2issues discussed in Latin America at least since the 1950s; just as
in those old debates, it is often difficult to establish where
scientific economics ends and political preference begins.

Judgments

about the speed of adjustment in different markets and evaluation of

the social costs of alternative dynamic paths are still based mostly

on hunches and sketchy evidence.

The eclecticism of this paper re

flects the troubled state of macroeconomics .
It would be disingenuous to hide one's political preferences
behind the technicalities of stabilization plans, at least when dis
cussing the Southern Cone case.

The awesome events of the 1970s in that

part of Latin America rule that out.

The reader is warned that what

follows reflects a perplexed centrist political position, which to
reject the horrors of the Bureaucratic Authoritarian Stat~/ finds it
unnecessary to cover up the economic "chien-lit" of Populism.
key underlying assumption will be that a mixed economy

The

is a

desirable and feasible model for most Latin American countries.
Many will find the combination of eclectic economics and centrist
politics comfortable only for a fence-straddlin g academic critic.
Perhaps.

For what it is worth, the hope that the 1980s will see that

messy and undramatic formula gaining ground in Latin America encourages
the writing of this paper.
I. Historical Background and Initial Conditions
The post-Second-~o rld War economic history of Southern Cone coun
tries is littered with failed stabilization plans; in some cases the

-3failures go further back.

The basic failures are the inability to

bring inflation down to U.S. (or in earlier days, U.K.) levels, and
to eradicate tendencies toward disequilibrium in the balance of pay
ments.

A plausible hypothesis is that, ceteris paribus, the longer

the history of failed stabilization plans, the smaller will be the
chances of success (and/or the greater the costs of success) of any
new plan.

Besides reading daily newspapers, economic agents carry in

their heads an economic history inducing them to discount any claim

that "inflation will be down to zero within a year", regardless of
how fiercely those claims are backed up.

The expectations forming

their behavior are based less on textbook models than on memories of
previous failures within their own country.

If, as it appears to be

the case, the private cost of erring on the low side is greater than
that of too high an estimate of inflation, the stage is set for a
viscous inertia in the inflation rate.!./ Inflation turns out to be
more like Sisyphus' rock than like Alexander's knot.
A typical Southern Cone ~tabilization plan will be preceded, say
during the one or two years before its announcement, by an acceleration
of the chronic inflation.

That acceleration will be accompanied by an

increased variability in relative prices, a variability having little
justification from the viewpoint of economic efficiency.

Both the

rate of inflation and relative prices become less predictable at this
stage.

Part of the erratic fluctuations in relative prices will arise

from government attempts to control inflation by sporadically freezing
some prices regarded as strategic, such as those for foreign exchange,

necessities, public utilities, transport and credit,followed by abrupt
upward adjustments.

As those adjustments are only partial, most of those

'prices

including interest rates will move far away from plausible

equilibrium values.
Deficits in the balance of payments, vanishing foreign exchange
reserves and difficulties in servicing the foreign debt will be of
aore immediate concern than the acceleration of inflation and the
growing variability and distortion of relative prices to governments
which for short will be called Populist in this stylized description
of events.
Both internal and external factors contribute to bring about
this lamentable state of affairs.

The early stages of Populist govern

ments are likely to have witnessed substantial expansion in government
expenditures not financed by tax collections, either because the op
position blocks efforts to raise taxes or because the government regards
fiscal and monetary reanagement as less important than structural reforms.
Fiscal deficits are more likely to be financed by borrowing from the
Central Bank than from either the domestic or foreign private sectors.
Increased public expenditure will be channelled more towards consump
tion than investment, although in human capital formation important
advances may be registered.

Across-the-board massive wage increases

also accompany the early stages of Populist governments.

Because

these measures will be felt first in output expansion, especially of
wage-goods, rather than an acceleration of inflation (which may even
decline during the early stages of Populism), the government will

be confirmed in the wisdom of its heterodoxy.

Pressure on the balance

of payments in those early times can be handled by strengthening ad
ministrative import-repressing mechanisms, drawing down reserves and
aeeking foreign loans.

Even sympathetic observers warning of future

dangers due to excesses in fiscal,·monetary, exchange rate and income
policies will be dismissed by the remark that "now the economy works

-5different ly".

Under those euphoric circumsta nces concern for economic

efficienc y, export-pro motion and a minimum of concern for fiscal
and monetary prudence will be regarded as prima facie evidence of

"reaction ary positions " not only by most Populist politicia ns, but
also by governmen t economist s giving top priority to achieving struc
tural reforms, or seeking a rapid transitio n to a centrally planned

economy, or simply believing that economic efficienc y, export
promotion , and prudent fiscal and monetary policies are of little
consequen ce for the welfare of most people in the country.
External events may or may not add to the euphoria of the early
stages of Populism but frequentl y add to its closing troubles.

The

external shocks may come from a deteriora tion in the terms of trade,
or from hostile foreign governmen ts intending to "make the (Populist )

economy scream."

Even when the external shocks (or an exogenous

domestic one, such as a drought) are relativel y minor, they can seriously
destabili ze an economy already weakened by the consequen ces of
Populist economic policies.
During the last stages of Populism there will be general agreement
that "things cannot go on like this" and that something must be done.

Within the Populist coalition some will argue for a bold move toward
centrally planned socialism , thus further encouragi ng capital flight
and a slump in private investmen t.

Moderate Populist technocra ts may

be able to attempt their own stabiliza tion plans, which will come too
late.

The oppositio n will move for the kill, culiminat ing in a

military coup.

-6The new government then launches its stabilizatio n plan, usually
in consultatio n with the Internation al Monetary Fund.
to note is that the plan will have several targets:

A first thing
a restoration

of balance of payments equilibrium and the orderly servicing of the
foreign debt; control and elimination of inflation; and the creation
of a structure of relative prices conducive to an efficient allocation

of resources.

Plans undertaken most recently are more emphatic, and

even radical, regarding the need for basic policy reforms, especially

in the areas of foreign trade and domestic financial markets.

Earlier

plans, say those of the 1950s, focused mostly on short term balance
of payments and inflation targets, leaving the system of protection
and "financial repression" largely unaffected.
The instruments are well known:

strict limits on the expansion

of overall banking credit; reduction in the share of that credit
expansion claimed by the public sector; adjustment, often large and
abrupt, in the prices which had lagged behind inflation, especially
the price of foreign exchange and interest rates; the removal of dis
tortions, such as import controls and excessive tariffs; and, somewhat
inconsisten tly with the new dominant philosophy, a special kind of
incomes policy consisting primarily of tough limits on money wage
increases.

Once-and-fo r-all steps will accompany the stabilizatio n package,

such as the renegotiatio n of the foreign debt.

Naturally, each plan

will have sui generis targets and instruments , but for a given epoch
their differences are less remarkable than their similaritie s.
The circumstanc es under which these policies are undertaken will
not allow for much "fine-tuning " of the instruments , nor a careful
phasing of the different measures through time.

The "something- has-

-7to-be done" syndro me, howev er, will give the new autho
rities some
room to maneu ver; for a consi derab le time they can blame
econo mic

diffi culti es on the depos ed Popu lists, and a reliev ed
bourg eoisie , with
their prope rty right s confir med, will conte mplat e short
term econo mic

hards hips with equan imity .

Entre prene urs, in parti cular , will find

the reesta blishm ent of their autho rity withi n facto ries
ample com

pensa tion for sltigg ish sales .

Socia l group s openl y oppos ing the new

polic ies will be handl ed manu milit ari.
The coher ence and stead iness of appli catio n of the stabi
lizati on
plans shoul d not be exagg erated .

Auth oritar ian regim es are not free

of hesit ation s, inter nal divis ions nor perso nality clash
es.

Even

when The Minis ter does not chang e, polic ies may be signi
fican tly
modif ied, as in Argen tina since 1976.

Two diffe rent views of the

excha nge rate, for examp le, may claim the mantl e of ortho
doxy:

one

advoc ating a fair degre e of flexi bility , anoth er wishi
ng to use the
excha nge rate to guide the price level towar d stabi lity.

The forme r

or "old orthod oxy" regar ds the money suppl y as the main
determ inant of

the domes tic price level and orien ts the excha nge rate
towar d balan ce
of payme nts targe ts.

The "new orthod oxy" will favor manip ulatio n of

dome stic credi t expan sion as the key for achie ving balan
ce of payme nts
targe ts, sharin g with old struc tural ists the belie f that
the excha nge
rate canno t influe nce relat ive price s, but only the
price level .

While

the "old orthod oxy" relied on model s devel oped for large
indus triali zed
count ries, the "new orthod oxy" views South ern Cone circum
stanc es as not
very diffe rent from those of Benel ux and Centr al Amer
ica. What follow s

will neces sarily abstr act from chang es and count ermar ches
in stabi lizati on
plans , but will retur n to the varie ty of views on excha
nge rate polic ies.

-8II. The Scorecard
The stabilization plans achieve their clearest and quickest
success in the Balance of Payments.

Within months international

reserves will be on the rise and foreign creditors becalmed.

De

velopments in the capital account, having to do with financial flows,
explain a good share of the short-run turnaround.

Debt renegotiation,

IMF credits, the end and reversal of capital flight and the end of
speculation against a previously overvalued exchange rate all contribute
in the same direction.

These considerations, which were already im

portant in stabilization plans adopted during the 1950s, have become
even more so under the circumstances of the late 1970s.

Some special

characteristics of stabilization plans undertaken in a world of high
financial capital mobility will be discussed in the next section.
Help from the current account will be modest in the short run.
However, a drop in the quantum of merchandise imports may contribute
something to balance of payments equilibrium even in the ver.y short
run.

A number of conflicting forces influence the import quantum: the

levels of domestic output and capital formation; the new domestic
relative price of importables (itself subject to contradictory influences
from devaluation versus liberalization and tariff cuts); the cost
and availability of foreign export credits; and the levels of domestic

inventories of importables at the time of the launching of the plan.
The net result of these influences will be in doubt, and will provide

a clue as to whether the stabilization plan is having severe short
term costs:

a steep drop in the import quantum is likely to signal

a severe slump in real output and investment.

-9An increase and diversification of exports has been a major

secondary target of stabilization plans, with some variety in the

instruments brought to bear for that purpose.

An increase in the

real exchange rate applicable to exports is a connnon feature; its
greater stability has also been sought by a crawling peg policy.
In addition, some plans introduce or expand selective tax, credit,
and other subsidies as part of the export-promotio n package, in
spite of IMF disapproval.

In the very short run these measures

are unlikely to be reflected in an increase in the export quantum.

But their success in increasing non-traditiona l exports in the
medium run, often aided by the excess capacity created by a fall
in domestic demand, has been a more noteworthy feature, and one of
the most impressive successes of stabilization plans.

Evidence

indicates a clear victory for export-optimis ts.
Inflation has proven to be more stubborn than the authors of
stabilization plans expected.

Before the start of the plans hyper

inflation was often at hand; it is unclear whether,~ post, this
provides a good explanation for the disappointing results obtained in
this front, as it could be argued that hyperinflation provides condi
tions making its abrupt termination possible, as in the Central

European cases of the 1920s.

No Southern Cone stabilization plan

has attempted a currency reform, and in the very short run the
adjustment of lagging strategic prices has in fact frequently led to
an acceleration of inflation.

After the burst of "corrective

inflation", authorities will take pride in the deceleration of
price increases, even if the deceleration does not match official

-10forecasts.

Even the consolation of ever declining rates of inflation

comes to an end after four years or so, before reaching, say United
States levels.

Very seldom is the rate brought down below the 15-20

percent per annum range; it may remain above what the country had
historically experienced in what the new authorities depict as the
"bad old days".

Ironically, at this late and frustrating stage,

there may be moves to further squeeze inflation by delaying not
just wage adjustments , but also the crawling peg and other key prices,
such as public utility rates.

Standard price indices may be revised,

leaving out items experiencin g the largest price increases.

As under

Populism, these tactics will contribute to expectation s opposite to
those the authorities had hoped for.
Even in cases where excess demand was a plausible explanation
for the high rates of inflation during the pre-plan period, its
explanatory power declines as the months go by and excess capacity and
foreign exchange reserves pile up.

Remaining fiscal deficits and/or

high rates of inc~ease in the money supply provide weak explanation s
under conditions of declining output and shrinking real credit and
cash balances.

Excessive trade union power can hardly be blamed when

real wages collapse and union leaders are jailed, or worse.

One is

left with still imprecise references to lags and expectation s, to
increasing mark-ups, to monopoly power in industry and commerce or to
imported inflation.

This state of affairs is also found in industrializ ed

countries; what makes the Southern Cone case unique is the bewildering
quantitativ e dimensions of the stagflation problem.

-11The failure of import liberalizati on and tariff reductions to
contain price increases in the very short run has been disappointi ng;
far from competitive commercial firms or recalcitran t custom offic.1.als

may block a result expected a priori and emphasized with hope in
the 1960s literature.

The upward thrust provided by exchange rate

devaluation works faster than the downward pressures generated by
tariff cuts and the elimination of import quotas.

More generally,

the Law of One Price, so important for models underpinnin g the new
orthodoxy, appears to work better on the side of exportable goods
than elsewhere; the line between importable and non-traded goods is
blurry, especially in countries which have lived under rigorous
protection for many years.

An Argentina is not quickly turned into

a Netherlands (nor a Guatemala).
It can be argued that the inflation persisting after the start
of the stabilizatio n plan may be surprisingl y stubborn, but at least
it is accompanied by less distortions and less erratic relative price
changes than the prestabiliz ation one.

The payoff to a more rational

structure of relative prices in terms of increased real output, however,

will be slow in coming.

Indeed, either stagnation or a decline in

output has been more usual in the Southern Cone.

Given the restruc

turing of incentives one could have expected a decline in production
of some sectors, such as those producing highly protected importables
and some non-traded goods.

But their decline is often not only

speedier than the expansion of sectors now enjoying favorable incentives
but also unnecessari ly drags down the output of many non-traded goods.
In spite of continuing price increases, one may diagnose this
situation as arising from a reduction in aggregate demand going beyond

what is required to make room for an expansion in the production of

-12exportables and those importables and non-traded goods benefitting from
the new constellation of relative prices.

This overkill is one of the

more puzzling economic features of Southern Cone stabilization plans,
and perhaps cannot be fully explained without reference to the new

authorities' wish to "discipline" the labor force partly by creating
a soft labor market.

The high priority given to a quick restoration

of balance of payments equilibrium and smooth foreign debt servicing
also contributes to the overkill.
The cut in real aggregate demand arises partly from policies
already mentioned, such as the reduction in domestic credit expansion
for both the public and the private sectors, as well as from redis
tributive effects generated by the policy package, which have asymmetrical
spending consequences.

The most spectacular of these is a reduction in

real wages of the (previously) best organized segments of the urban
working class, which are quickly reflected in a fall in consumption of
wage goods.

Real wage rates in these economies influence aggregate

demand as well as profit rates and international competitiveness; in
the short run the output depressing effect of wage cuts outweigh their
expansionary impact via the latter mechanisms.
The success achieved in the fight against inflation, modest
though it may be, is to be credited to a large extent to the wage
repressing incomes policy, while the balance of payment success de

rives support from the sagging real aggregate demand.
The restructuring of relative prices generates many other short
run redistributive effects.

A priori there is no reason why they

should influence overall income distribution in a systematic way:
losers in highly protected industries, those who had access to arti
ficially cheap credit or cheap imports, etc., are likely to have been

-13in high-income groups, while producers of exportables could include

small farmers.

Consumers of previously subsidized foodstuffs in

the cities may have income levels higher than those of rural food
producers.

In the Southern Cone case, however, the net effect of

the policy package appears to have a regressive effect on income
distribution, although the general picture is murky.

Open urban

unemployment, for example, has been substantial in the post-1973
Chilean case and relatively minor in the post-1976 Argentine plan.
Argentina, like Germany,seems to have exported its unemployment to
neighboring countries.

The decline in real wages in Argentina

and Chile, which had started before the change in government, was
so steep as to raise questions as to how households managed their
budgets; in the Chilean case the combination of falling real wages
with increasing unemployment for a non-trivial length of time has
been particularly striking.

The workings of formal and informal

labor markets under these peculiar conditions remain unclear, but
it appears that structural changes have occurred and that wage
dispersion has increased.
During the early stages of stabilization plans asset markets will

be especially volatile, as expected changes in relative prices and.
in

the rules of the game are capitalized.

Those well-informed and

with access to national or international institutional credit can make
large sums in a short time.

The long-run efficiency gains from such

financial speculation, especially when it is based on privileged knowledge
of future public policy, are moot.

Sensational capital gains by a few

will not improve willingness by the many to tighten their belts.

-14A cut in consumption is less painful when accompanied by an
increase in investment.

Perhaps the most disappointing feature of

many of the Southern Cone stabilization plans is the weakness shown
by capital formation, particularly when the public sector leads in
reducing its investment, as in the Chilean case (in contrast with
the more pragmatic Brazilian example).

A skeptical private

sector shows caution in undertaking long term commitments,
particularly when the newly liberated financial markets offer fairly
liquid investment outlets with high yields.

Excess capacity in many

industries producing importables and non-traded goods provide little
encouragement for capital formation, but even in those sectors where
incentives are favorable and capacity limits output entrepreneurs
with long memories prefer to wait until the dust settles.

will act not very differently from.domestic entrepreneurs:

Foreigners
they will

show more interest in buying paper than in installing machinery and

equipment.

The new open door policies will reap only modest results,

at least in the short and medium runs, in direct foreign investments;

the new investments are more likely to go into natural resources
and finance than into manufacturir.g.

From the viewpoint of the balance

of payments, however, the sluggishness in overall capital formation

will be most clearly reflected in a decline in imports of machinery
and equipment.
Even a perfectly rational constellat~on of prices and investment
incentives cannot fully convince entrepreneurs that such edifice will
be in place tomorrow.

When economic rationality is built upon an

arbitrary political regime, which may depend on one General's heartbeat,

-15entrepreneurs will not be easily persuaded that today's relative
prices are good predictors of future ones.

While the economic team

builds policy on the assumption that households and firms behave
rationally and process information intelligently, the political
team assumes citizens cannot be trusted to choose their leaders

nor to read an uncensored press.
III. Some Additional Complications of the Late 1970s
Stabilization plans differ in design and consequences not only
from one country to another, but also for the same country at various
times.

For example, external circumstances changed between the 1955

and the 1976 Argentine stabilization plans in some crucial aspects.
During the 1970s inflationary impulses coming from abroad made
domestic disinflationary efforts even more difficult.

Indeed, it

is frequently argued that inflation in the dollar prices of the
basket of tradable goods relevant for Southern Cone countries has
been far greater than the inflation registered in standard U.S. price
indices.

Volatility in external terms of trade has also risen during

the 1970s; for some countries~ especially oil importers such as Chile
and Uruguay, there have been sharp deteriorations in terms of trade

at crucial stages of their stabilization plans.

The 1970s have also

witnessed a large increase in international short-term capital mobility;
this section will focus on how this fact has influenced Southern Cone
stabilization plans.
As noted earlier, these plans have coupled more liberal trade
and exchange rate policies with some liberalization of domestic financial
markets.

Complete liberalization of those markets has not been
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usually achieved , but enough has been done to generate fresh dilemmas.
The major dilemma can be sketched as follows.

Trade-lib eralizatio n

reforms have sought a higher and more stable real exchange rate, so
as to expand and diversify exports, and to reduce reliance on import
controls and tariffs.

The liberaliz ation of local financial markets

tends to increase real returns on domestic financial assets, even

when the stabiliza tion plan achieves only modest results fighting

inflation .

Restrictio ns on domestic credit expansion typically

accompany the policy reforms, so that local interest rates can go
substanti ally beyond those abroad plus the expected exchange rate
depreciat ion.

Domestic and foreign wealth owners will increase their

net holdings of local financial assets, while local entrepren eurs will

seek foreign loans.

Some of these tendencie s were already present

in stabiliza tion plans of the 1950s; since then, however, the interest
elasticit y of the internatio nal supply of financial funds has increased

dramatica lly and the local financial markets have become more fluid
and sophistic ated.
With an unrestric ted link between the domestic and the internati onal
financial markets, large portfolio adjustmen ts will occur, and a capital
infow will result.

The real exchange rate will appreciat e relative to

what it would have been without such an inflo~.

The liberaliz ation of

the domestic financial market and of its links with those abroad will

work atcross-p urposes with export promotion .

If at the same time the

authoriti es are dismantli ng import-re pressing mechanism s, the import
competing sector will be doubly damaged.

Eventuall y the portfolio

adjustmen t should be completed and a larger net debt will have to be
serviced so that the real exchange rate, to the delight of exporters ,
will have to depreciat e relative to the days of the capital inflow.

-17In a growingworldsom e gross inflows will persist, but pressures on
the exchange rate will be similar to those outlined.
In practice the transition is proving to be far from smooth.
Many imperfections remain:

some segments of the local financial

market are still controlled, leading to a high variance in interest
rates.

Most transactions are short term; efforts to build a local

market for financial instruments with maturities of more than a few
months have met with little success.

High reserve requirements introduce

a large wedge between active and passive interest rates when the

Central Bank pays no interest on those reserves.

Even when the passive

rate eventually becomes equal to the foreign interest rate plus the
expected depreciation of the exchange rate, those borrowers who have
no international financial links must pay the often extravagant local
active rates.

Such differentiation between entrepreneurs, according

to their borrowing facilities, will have both equity and efficiency
consequences.
Southern cone authorities have been reluctant to allow the exchange
rate to fluctuate freely; they either maintain a crawling peg whose
formula is only vaguely known, or announce what the gradually depreciating
exchange rate will be for several months in advance.

In either case

capital inflows will be reflected in changes in official foreign exchange
holdings, which will swell the money supply.

An increasing share of

the expansion in local money will come from changes in exchange reserves,

at the expense of domestic credit expansion.

The more fluid the link

between domestic and international financial markets, the greater the
loss of control over the money supply will be.

While Southern Cone

monetary authorities hesitate between the old and new orthodoxies,
the management of domestic credit, exchange rates and international

-18financial flows can become erratic.
Argentine experienc e during 1978 and 1979 illustrat es most clearly
some of the troublesom e short run dynamic processes which can occur under

5/
the new circumsta nces.Argentine authoriti es have announced the
exchange rate with respect to the U.S. dollar for several months ahead
of time, hoping that such informati on will help to cluster inflation ary
6/
expectati ons around a lower path.At the start of this policy,
domestic interest rates, or at least a significa nt group of them,
substanti ally exceed foreign dollar interest rates after adjusting for
expected devaluati on of the peso relative to the dollar.

Massive

financial inflows occur, expanding Central Bank reserves and the money
supply.

This injection of liquidity will relieve at least some agents

pressed by ceilings on domestic credit expansion .

If future

~valuati on schedules are sensitive to accumulat ing foreign exchange
holdings, so that there is a slowdown in the pace of peso devaluati on,
certain instabili ty will be introduce d,as that slowdown will further
increase the attractive ness of domestic financial assets, thus leading
to an even greater capital inflow.

Exporters and previousl y protected

producers of importabl es will find these short run dynamics singularl y
perverse, and will clamor for faster devaluati on or subsidies .

Author

ities will point to bulging reserves as evidence that faster devaluati on

is unnecessa ry, a propositi on which net borrowers from abroad, importers
and outflowin g tourists will find very sound.

Those in charge of battling

inflation will also look kindly upon the revaluati on trend, as under
the new orthodoxy the exchange rate is expected to determine the price
level, while money supply is regarded as endogenou s (domestic credit
expansion being the policy variable under the control of the authoriti es).

-19Even if the pace of devaluation is not adjusted downward because of
large reserves, producers of tradable goods will face a difficult

period of transition, during which it is likely that the prices of
non-traded goods will rise at a faster pace than those for traded
goods.

In countries historically concerned with foreign exchange

shortages, the Swiss-type embarrassment of riches brought about by
capital inflows is a novel situation, and a bitter surprise to
exporters who expected that the new policies would encourage their
activities.
Debates as to whether a given currency is overvalued or not
have become more complex in the 1970s than they were in earlier
years.

Even if one takes a simple purchasing-pow er-parity (PPP)

approach to what the exchange rate should be, one has to agree
on the relevant index for "rest-of-the-wo rld" price increases.

One

problem, already noted, is that world prices for the Southern Cone
basket of tradables seem to have behaved differently from standard
U.S. (or U.N.) indices.

Then one has to take into account fluctuations

among key currencies to devise a suitably weighted effective exchange
rate.

Moving beyond a simple PPP approach, allowances would have

to be made for the effect on equilibrium exchange rates of changes in
external terms of trade as well as in domestic commercial policies
which are considered permanent.

Tendencies in long-term capital flows,

as well as judgments about productivity growth in different sectors
of the economy (e.g., has there been a permanent change in Pampean rural
productivity growth?) also have to be taken into account.

Reasonable

people can disagree on a number of these judgments, a disagreement
encouraged by erratic world market conditions and compounded by faulty
data.

The urge to "let the market decide" is checked by doubts as

-20to the desirability of a clean float in countries where, in spite
of recent reforms, domestic financial markets remain limited.
It was noted earlier that in several Southern Cone countries
local interest rates have remained substantially above those abroad
plus exchange rate depreciation, even when large capital inflows
have been registered.

A number of hypotheses, which cannot be

explored here, are compatible with this stylized fact.

Note,

however, that domestic interest rates can be negative, defined with
respect to local inflation, yet incentives could remain for an inflow
of short term capital.

Such a situation, which prevailed in

Argentina sporadically during 1978-1979, is quite plausible when
prices of non-traded goods are rising faster than the pace of exchange
depreciation and/or when the "world" nominal interest rate is lower
than "world" inflation.

Note further that under these circum-

stances the indexing of public debt instruments so as to make
their interest rates positive with respect to local inflation
will introduce downward stickiness to domestic interest rates.
That indexing will also encourage speculative shifts among
different financial assets depending on inflationary expectations.
A generous indexing of public debt could then be said to be "crowding

out" not only private capital formation, but also the production of
tradable goods via the induced capital inflow and the resulting real
appreciation of the exchange rate.

Public expenditures financed by

such borrowing are less likely to involve capital formation in some
cases (e.g.,Argentina) than in others (e.g., Brazil).

The future

servicing of such public debt could raise serious problems.
The important role played by indexed public borrowing in the
liberalization of domestic capital markets coupled with the also

-21extens ive public sector borrow ings in interna tional capita l market s
raise the issue of the optima l mix of both types of borrow ing, both
from a narrow public finance viewpo int as well as from that of
strengt hening and develop ing local capita l market institu tions.
So far, domest ic capita l market s appear unable to compete with inter

nation al ones in medium and long-te rm maturi ties; it is often
asserte d that in Southe rn Cone (and other Latin Americ an) countr ies
interna tional capita l market s are still used to interm ediate between
domest ic residen ts except for short term and margin al transac tions.
Even author ities as commit ted to laissez -faire as those in
Chile have been unable to handle pressur es arising from interna tional
t
short-t erm capita l flows withou t recours e to ad hoc compul sory deposi
require ments for foreign loans to the private sector , raising
their effecti ve intere st costs.

The more pragma tic Brazili an

author ities have freque ntly used those measur es as well as other forms
g,
of exchang e contro ls, plus a crawlin g peg which keeps specul ators guessin

all limitin g the short-t erm links between domest ic and interna tional
7/
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'capita l marke ts.IV. Are these Hardsh ips Really Necessa ry?
To what conter factua l situati on should one compare Southe rn Cone
stabili zation plans?

Earlie r section s have emphas ized the difficu lt

econom ic and politic al conditi ons under which they are underta ken;
it will not do to critici ze those plans in a spirit of self-

confid ent ahisto rical perfect ionism .

The presen t state of macroec onomic

theory would make such pretens ion doubly rash.

Further more, these

stabili zation plans include measur es, particu larly in the area of
foreign trade, whose details and timing may be debate d, but
whose major thrust was long overdu e in the Southe rn Cone.

It would

-22be tragic if those justifiably revolted by the political excesses of
the Bureaucratic Authoritarian State were to make a one-to-one
association between, say, export-promotion policies and those regimes.
At least when evaluating econoMic policies, a spirit of selectivity·
and restraint should guide the critique.

The architects and

apologists of Southern Cone stabilization plans would also benefit
from this stance; their strident triumphalism, and claims to scientific
superiority, facilitated by the suppression of domestic criticism by
brute force, are at best ridiculous.

It is indeed a melancholy spectacle

to see those trained in free debate and fierce contempt for economic
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irrationality becoming meek political minions of Madmen in Authority.-

Accepting that some sort of stabilization plan was necessary,
one can discuss the importance given to different targets, the use made
of various instruments and the time frame adopted in the use of instru
ments and to achieve targets.
It was seen earlier that major costs of Southern Cone stabilization
plans have included a reduction in output and a lag in capital formation.
Austerity in consumption has not necessarily led to more investment, but
to underutilization of the labor force and installed capacity.

It is

difficult to accept that this waste is necessary either as atonement
for past excesses or for future efficiency.

Too simple a diagnosis of

inflation leads to an excessively sharp reduction in aggregate demand,
using credit, fiscal and incomes policies.

A doctrinaire faith in

private as compared with public investment contributes to these costs.
Here one can contrast the Brazilian and Colombian practice with that

-23of Chile; the former have maintained fairly active
public investment programs even during stabilization plans.

The

more those public investments contribute to expand capacity in
bottleneck sectors,or the more they fit with the restructuring of
the economy along more efficient lines, the better; but even that
old employment-generating standby, public construction,could be
preferable to severe underutilization of labor and capacity.
Even while proclaiming faith in laissez-faire, Sout·hern Cone
stabilization plans have adopted incomes policies, albeit of an un
balanced sort.

Official action has tended to directly repress

wages more than prices.

Some argue that competition, particularly

that coming from abroad, will be enough to restrain prices, but that
state power is needed to countervail that of trade unions.

Blaming

Southern Cone trade union power seems ghoulish in the late 1970s;
faith on the speedy competitive discipline overly optimistic.

As

noted earlier, countries which for many years have had fairly closed
economies are likely to take some time before developing commercial
channels which effectively enforce the
foreign and domestic markets.

Law of One Price

between

At least during the transition period

there is room for price guidelines covering the largest industrial and
commercial firms, guidelines which could be based on projected changes
in exchange rates, tariffs and foreign prices.

Those guidelines could

help cluster private expectations about future inflation better than
exaggerated claims often heard at the start of harsh stabilization plans.
Given the historical record, the goals of more rational, less volatile
relative prices, and a more predictable overall inflation rate deserve

-24greater weight than "whipping inflation now".

In countries with a

tradition of price stability it makes much sense to take extraordinary
measures to suppress the beginning of inflationary pressures, yet
for countries with long histories of.chronic inflation sporadic fits
of monetary machismo will buy few positive tangible results.

Reliance on a preannounced and declining rate of exchange rate
devaluation as the key instrument to lower inflation also appears
Stubborn inflation in the prices of non-traded

as excessively risky.

goods can lead to overvaluation,

The real prices of exportables could

be both less favorable and more unstable than under a crawling peg
regime whose devaluation pace is not announced, as in the Colombian
and Brazilian cases.

The latter system has the virtue that while it

signals that the government will maintain "reasonable"
and steady real prices for exportables over the medium and long run,

it keeps speculators guessing, thus helping to reduce short-term
capital flows which may be destabilizing.

Preannounced exchange rates

reduce the uncertainty of financial speculators while increasing that
of exporters, a peculiar trad·e-off.

It could be argued that for the

sake of maintaining the momentum of export expansion and diversification
the Colombian-type crawling peg adopts an accommodating stance toward

inflation,

Yet, if the preannounced and slower devaluation pace fails

to reduce inflation fairly quickly, expectations will grow that sharper
devaluations lie ahead.

The government will be faced with the 1950s

dilemma of giving in to such expectations, rekindling after all the
inflationary spiral and losing any remaining credibility, or adopting
very contractionary policies to validate the overvalued exchange
rate.

-25Stabiliza tion plans have usually improved the fiscal machinery
of the public sector:

tax-colle ction has been tightened up and prices

of public enterpris es have been raised.

Generally , however, even

the most authorita rian regimes have been timid in using selective
fiscal measures improving both efficienc y and income distribut ion, such
as land taxes, or in taxing windfall profits and luxury consumpti on.
These measures could help to spread austerity more evenly without
harming efficienc y and growth.
The combinati on of steadier real aggregate demand, larger
capacity-a ugmenting capital formation and firmer and more balanced
incomes policy may result in higher or lower overall rates of
inflation than those actually registere d.

Improveme nts in the

balance of payments and reserve accumulat ion, however, would clearly be
less dramatic than those observed.

Looking just at the results of

Southern Cone stabiliza tion plans one could conclude that the Balance
of Payments target has been the one authoriti es really care about.

Such a stance makes more sense for the Internati onal Monetary Fund and
foreign creditors eager to see punctual debt servicing than for
domestic authoriti es. Maintaini ng higher levels of real demand and
capital formation would lead to substanti ally higher imports than
those observed, and it could marginall y reduce the upsurge in non
tradition al exports.

An easier credit stance could mean lower real

interest rates, and a less frantic pace of financial capital inflows;

direct foreign investmen t, however, could be more buoyant.

On the

whole, balance of payments and reserve targets will have to be more
modest, and a different mix of private and public debt may be necessary .

-26Policies redressing the balance of incentives as between exports
and import-substitution were long overdue.

During the 1960s steps

had been taken in this direction by some centrist Southern Cone
governments, such as those of Presidents Frei and Illia, but not
boldly enough.

More recent efforts to open up the current account

cover a variety of approaches, from the eclectic Brazilian and
Colombian policies to the fiercely textbookish Chilean ones.

The

former have included, besides exchange rate policy, selective export
in~entives, such as tax and credit subsidies, direct deals with large_
companies, etc., while never completely dismantling import controls
nor reducing tariffs to almost free trade levels.

It is unclear to

what extent the very rapid elimination of import-repressing mechanisms

in Chile and Argentina have contributed to short-run output and
investment sluggishness independently of cuts in real aggregate demand;
it could be that the latter have been much more powerful than the
former.

What is.clear is that the Brazilian and Colombian policy

packages have been compatible both with reasonable growth rates in
output and investment, and with significant expansions in non-traditional
exports.

In the Colombian case import liberalization came after

substantial progress had been registered in export promotion.
While foreign trade policies of semi-industrialized countries

have been exhaustively studied and discussed for at least twenty years,
less efforts have been invested in the study of the capital account

of their Balance of Payments, besides those related to obsolete
discussions of foreign aid and inconclusive debates on costs and
benefits of direct foreign investment.

As noted in Section III, the

interaction of liberalization of domestic financial markets with

a highly efficient and ubiquitous international capital market

-27generates pressures which policy makers could safely ignore during the
exchange-control-riddled world of the 1950s.

While much additional

work is necessary in this area, it appears that a liberalization of the
current account should take precedence over liberalizing the capital
account.

This approach is similar to that of the Bretton Woods

charter, and is consistent with the post-war practice of a number
of small open European.economies, such as Denmark and Finland, which
have maintained restrictions on the freedom of domestic residents to
choose their financial portfolios among all international assets, and
have also exercised market as well as non-market controls over financial
inflows.

In some cases the exchange rate applicable to capital trans

actions has differed from that used for current account operations.
These policies may be discussed as to efficacy (can they be enforced?) as
well as to their long-run effects on economic efficiency.

But their

presence even in sophisticated economies indicates the seriousness of
the concern that capital flows can generate disruptive short-run macroeconomic disturbances.

Given the magnitude of domestic disequilibria during the

implementation of Southern Cone stabilization plans, and the weakness of
the monetary tools available to the authorities, the real costs of the
disturbances which could follow a premature lifting

of controls over

international financial flows could be substantial.
One may also wonder whether without some "infant market" pro
tection, local financial markets will be able to grow beyond marginal
short-term intermediation.

Note also that even in the United

States there are troublesome inequities in the fact that smaller
domestic banks and their customers have less access to the Euro
currency market than the large international banks and their customers;

-28the former are said to absorb a disproportionate share of the burden
of restrictive policiesJJ In the Southern Cone this dichotomy will
overlap with that involving domestic firms and transnational en~er
prises.

Both in Argentina and Chile the rebirth of a variety of
financial instruments offering handsome returns has probably con
tributed to a sluggish rate of real capital formation.

Indeed, the

coexistence of high real interest rates with mediocre output and
investment performance, as in Chile, raises the question as to which
are the projects or activities generating returns sustaining the interest
charges.

The liberalization of the domestic financial market appears

to have shifted the burden of the "inflation tax" from savers towards
marginal investors, with substantial deadweight losses in the process.
A more expansive domestic credit, at the expense of capital inflows,

could reduce those losses while maintaining the gains domestic
financial liberalization has brought to savers, especially small
and medium ones.

·v.

The International Framework
The rest-of-the-world provides credit to a country with a current

account deficit.

It may do so in a variety of ways:

buying its short

or long term paper, which may originate in its public or private sector;
buying real assets, etc.

Under normal circumstances these arrangements

can be made following standard market procedures, i.e., foreign finance

will be hired paying the going market rate.

At Bretton Woods it was

-29thought that such a mechanism should be supplemented by an internationally
controlled public source of short-term finance, cheaper and more stable
than alternative private sources.

Under the assumption that these

funds would have a non-trivial social opportunity cost, access to them
could not be automatic, so that the International Monetary Fund, acting
as the agent for the rest-of-the-world, would impose conditions to
ration their use.

Presumably the rest-of-the-world would have two

major concerns when dealing with a given country:

how that country's

policies affect world economic conditions, and getting the money back.
In dealing with small countries one at a time, the latter consideration
would be paramount.

Longer-term interactions between the small

country and the rest-of-the-world would presumably be handled via
other mechanisms and institutions, such as the World Bank.
These broad notions, which probably command widespread support,
in practice can be implemented with different degrees of liberality.
Not all countries are equally likely to be borrowers from the IMF,
so differences will arise regarding "conditionality."

This was already

true in 1944 and was reflected in the contrasting British and U.S.
approaches about access to the Fund.

Since then, the creditors'

view has been reinforced, so that less developed countries as a whole
regard the IMF as a niggardly source of credit.

Semi-industrialized

countries confident of their ability to obtain private finance on
their own have bypassed the Fund; Brazil has been an example of this
attitude.

Other countries have attempted such a stance, but either

because of bad luck or internal mismanagement have had to return to

-30the IMF as a lender of last resort and dispenser of an internationally

credible "Good Housekeeping seal"; Peru is the obvious example.
Under the latter circumstances harsh conditions will be likely, in
turn reinforcing the Fund's Gothic image.
Regardless of who is to blame for this state of affairs, the
consequence has been an underutilization of IMF credit, prima facie
evidence that something is amiss in the international framework
within which the balance of payments adjustment of semi-industrialized

countries occurs.

Within the Southern Cone context there is tangible

evidence of this point.

The Fund's purpose includes not only

supplying adequate credit flows while adjustment takes place, but
also the provision of a prudent stock of international liquidity.
Even those semi-industrialized countries adopting somewhat more
flexible exchange rate policies have maintained a strong demand for
international reserves.

Indeed, world economic conditions during the

1970s, from the floating of key currencies to the increase in the
probability of various shocks, may have increased that demand.

During

1977 and 1978, for example, the ratio of international reserves to
merchandise imports in both Argentina and Brazil reached levels sub10/
stantially above averages for the last twenty years.- Even if this
ratio had remained at average levels, rising world prices would have

induced an increase in the demand for reserves.

The contributions of

SDRs and Fund credit in the increase in Argentine and Brazilian
reserves have been small; most of the increase in liquidity has been
obtained by a more expensive and precarious fashion, i.e., expanding
the foreign debt, mainly to private banks.

-31Fund-generated increases in international liquidity may improve
the environment for stabilization plans, but they will not drastically

help to minimize their short-term costs.

Traditionally the Fund

viewed stabilization plans within a one-year horizon, which tended
to increase the chances of severe cuts in output and capital

formation.

In recent years this position has gradually changed, and

stabilizaJion plans have come to be viewed with a longer-term
horizon.

New credit facilities have been used to support stretched

out adjustment programs, which attempt to parcel out blame for
balance of payments disturbances between exogenous shocks (i.e., those
arising from worsening terms of trade of earthquakes)
created by domestic policies.

and those

Analysis has expanded beyond the

simplest versions of the monetary approach to the balance of payments,
which assume away underutilizatio n of capacity and sectoral imbalances.
These positive, although modest, changes come after many years
of criticism of the Fund's encouragement of stabilization plans whose
only targets appeared to be the punctual servicing of the foreign debt
and balance of payments equilibrium, at whatever cost.

During the

early years of the Allinnce for Progress and then later in the 1960s,
at the time of the Pearson Report, the advice was frequently heard that
stabilization efforts should be placed within the framework of develop
ment plans, and that the IHF and the World Bank should cooperate
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to this end.- The changes which have occurred in the international
economy during the 1970s, including the greater bargaining power of
some developing countries, have also contri.buted to the modification
of the Fund's advice.

-32The crawling peg and export subsidies have been two of the most
successful policy instruments used by South American countries during
the 1960s and 1970s.

The Fund's predilectio n for exchange rate

adjustments which were massive and presumably "once-and- for-all" and its
hostility to any semblance of multiple exchange rates made the IMF
(or its Western Hemisphere department) oppose or at least frown on
the use of those policy instruments .

In these areas it appears that

many in the Fund's staff are reluctant to abandon their old views
1
although it is difficult to document this conjecture.

Indeed, the

exact IMF role and advice in stabilizatio n plans have remained shrouded
in mystery, as its officials are reluctant to disclose details and
documentati on, pleading the need to protect the confidentia l nature of
their links with governments .

Permission to scholars to consult

documents older than, say, ten years would contribute to clarify
the IMF role in stabilizatio n plans.
Regardless of the explanation for the Fund's modificatio ns in its
stabilizatio n advice and facilities, its views could be expected to
have declining influence in the policy making of, say, Argentina
and Brazil, in contrast to Jamaica and Zaire.

Only gross mismanage

ment could place the former type of economy at the mercy of more-or
less enlightened Fund advice on short-run policy.

Rather, the

larger Southern Cone countries could be expected to have a greater voice

in discussions about the Fund's role in such systemic issues as
internation al liquidity,ex change rate surveillanc e, and supervision of
internation al capital markets.

It remains to be seen how these

influential developing countries, with strong voices at the Fund's
board of directors, will view staff proposals for stabilizatio n plans
in countries such as Jamaica and Zaire.
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